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The Restructuring of Monte dei Paschi di Siena.  
A Controversial Case in the EU Bank Resolution Regime
andRea Miglionico*
Abstract
The new regulatory tools introduced in the eu banking recovery and resolution 
regime that aim to reduce the intervention of supervisory authorities constitute a chal-
lenge for legislators and market actors. This article examines the controversial aspects 
of Monte dei Paschi di siena (MPs) rescue plans, taking into consideration the 
adopted restructuring options. although MPs is not global systemically important its 
collapse determined a serious impact in the eu banking sector. This article argues 
that to benefit from financial aid MPS had to be bailed-in, measure that policymakers 
and regulators are not always ready to implement. MPs represented a real concern to 
the italian central Bank and the european central Bank, and it demonstrated that 
banks rely on government bailout, something that it is difficult to change in the regu-
latory approach to failing credit institutions.
Keywords
Banking union, bail-in, non-performing loans, state aid, bailout, resolution regime, 
recovery plan, global systemically important banks, precautionary recapitalisation, 
securitisation.
1. Introduction
The creation of european Banking union with the granting of supervisory powers to 
the european central Bank (ecB) and the increased attention given by regulators to 
single Resolution Mechanism (sRM) and Bank Recovery and Resolution directive 
(BRRd)1 are some of the developments that in the aftermath of the global financial 
* Lecturer, University of Reading, School of Law. E-mail: a.miglionico@reading.ac.uk. The author 
is grateful to the anonymous reviewer for the useful comments provided on an early draft. any errors 
or omissions remain the sole responsibility of the author.
1 EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), Directive 2014/59/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014. These resolution tools require the establishing a frame-
work for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council 
Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 
2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 173 of 12 June 2014, p 190.
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crisis have brought the issue of financial stability back to the fore of legal and eco-
nomic policy debate.2 The intricate design of the BRRd (i.e., the harmonised regime 
for the eu as a whole) and the sRM for the Banking union, i.e., the eurozone rep-
resent the new framework of bank insolvency.3
The SRM contains three pillars: centralised resolution in a single authority (Board); 
a single set of supervisory powers and tools as defined in the BRRD; and a Single 
Bank Resolution Fund, which provides mutualised private financing of bank resolu-
tion tools. The Board is responsible of finding private solutions via acquisitions of 
crisis banks in the context of restructuring. under the supervision head, the ‘single 
supervisory Mechanism’ (ssM) put the ecB directly in charge as the supervisor for 
the largest eurozone banking groups.4 The dominant part of the eurozone’s banking 
system is monitored by a common institution: in substance, the ECB is the direct 
supervisor of the significant banks for the entire Eurozone and it has the right to 
inspect smaller banks that does not supervise directly.5
During the global financial crisis, the banking sector experienced a rapid rise in 
loan delinquencies and defaults driven by the limitations of the Basel rules and the 
adequacy of capital.6 The crisis revealed that non-performing loans (nPls)7 played 
a central role in the linkages between credit markets frictions and macroeconomic 
2 Jens-Hinrich Binder, Resolution: Concepts, Requirements, and Tools in Jens-hinrich Binder 
and dalvinder singh (eds), Bank Resolution: The European Regime, 25-26 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016). 
3 The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) has been established by Council Regulation (EU) 
No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning 
policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, OJ L 287 of 29 October 2013, p 63. 
The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) has been introduced by Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform pro-
cedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single 
Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, 
OJ L 225 of 30 July 2014, p 1.
4 The SSM is composed of the ECB and the national competent authorities, with the ECB in charge 
of its effective and consistent functioning (art. 6.1). The scope of application of the ssM Regulation 
comprises all euro area Member states on a compulsory basis and also non-euro area Member states 
that voluntarily enter into a ‘close cooperation’ with the ECB (Art. 7). The SSM Regulation confers 
‘specific tasks’ related to the prudential supervision of credit institutions to the ECB. See Commission 
release Statement/14/77, 20 March 2014.
5 Eilís Ferran and Valia Babis, The European Single Supervisory Mechanism 13 Journal of Cor-
porate Law Studies 255 (2013). The authors note that ‘designing the SSM has been an exercise in 
sophisticated legal gymnastics to fit within the existing Treaty framework, as well as high stakes politi-
cal manoeuvring and pragmatic decision-making’. 
6 Tara Sullivan and James Vickery, A Look at Bank Loan Performance, federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, 16 October 2013. It is pointed out that ‘at the start of 2007, only about 1 percent of 
bank loan balances were “nonperforming”, meaning that the loan was at least ninety days past due or 
in nonaccrual status. By late 2015, however, the average level of NPLs across the EU banks is 5.9 
percent while nPl ratios for the united states and Japan is less than 2 percent. see european Parlia-
ment, Non-performing loans in the Banking Union: stocktaking and challenges, 18 March 2016, 2. See 
also World Bank, Bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
FB.AST.NPER.ZS> (accessed 25 May 2018).
7 NPL is generally defined as a loan that is more than 90 days past due.
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vulnerabilities.8 The lack of a proper regulatory treatment of nPls highlighted the 
fragility of the banking system. The main problem is the absence of a harmonised 
framework to estimate the obligors’ ability to repay and whether it has deteriorated. 
in this context, some countries such as italy and greece registered a sharp rise of 
nPls and large losses among national banks.9 The italian banking sector reported an 
outstanding stock of €225 billion of gross NPLs mostly accumulated during the finan-
cial and sovereign debt crisis although recently this figure has significantly decreased.10 
In addition, the local dimension of the Italian banking sector and frequent political 
instability face obstacles to the development of nPls market, as observed ‘uncertain-
ties in recovery values can result in substantial gaps between book and market values, 
creating disincentives for banks to write-off nPls’.11 The deterioration of past-due 
loans triggered in the aftermath of the crisis has been accompanied by the negative 
performance of banks’ portfolio such as unicredit, Monte dei Paschi di siena (MPs), 
Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca. however the regulatory intervention 
adopted for the Veneto banks and the precautionary recapitalisation approved for 
MPS boosted investors’ confidence in the Italian banking sector.12
On July 2017, MPS reached an agreement for a public rescue in a form of a pre-
cautionary recapitalisation – according to Article 32(4)(d)(iii) of the BRRD and 
article 18(4)(d)(iii) of the sRM – after a long negotiation between the italian author-
ities and the commission. however, the public rescue of MPs can be considered the 
outcome of legacy problems that should have been resolved prior to implementation 
of BRRd and Banking union. This article argues that the rescue plan of MPs gained 
from the italian government circumvented the eu resolution regime as the bank could 
not be considered a solvent institution according to the criteria set in Article 32(4)(a)
(b)(c) of the BRRD and Article 18(4)(d)(iii) of the SRM. Specifically, MPS did not 
meet the condition of ‘long-term viability’ necessary to apply for precautionary 
recapitalisation raising doubts whether the public support was granted to cover private 
losses. MPS was not qualified to access the regulatory tools provided in point (d), 
paragraph 4, Article 32 of the BRRD that confines the precautionary recapitalisation 
to solvent institutions.13
8 Mwanza Nkusu, Nonperforming Loans and Macrofinancial Vulnerabilities in Advanced Econo-
mies, iMf Working Paper, 4 July 2011. The author observed a negative correlation between nPls and 
various macroeconomic variables.
9 EBA, Risk Dashboard. Data as of Q4 2016 (April 2017) at 30, <http://www.eba.europa.eu/doc 
uments/10180/1804996/EBA+Dashboard+-+Q4+2016.pdf/74c92eb4-3083-47fc-bd5d-6a8ac64e8393> 
(accessed 15 May 2018).
10 Bank of Italy, Financial Stability Report (November 2018), at n 2, 33-35. It is underlined that 
the coverage ratio – provisions in relation to the whole stock of NPLs – reached 54.3 percent.
11 José Garrido, Emanuel Kopp and Anke Weber, Cleaning-up Bank Balance Sheets: Economic, 
Legal, and Supervisory Measures for Italy, IMF Working Paper (July 2016), at 15-16.
12 Bank of Italy, supra n 10, at 42.
13 The provision provides that ‘extraordinary public financial support is required except when, in 
order to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State and preserve financial stabil-
ity, the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms: (i) a State guarantee 
to back liquidity facilities provided by central banks according to the central banks’ conditions, (ii) 
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The main concern is that the concept of solvency is not expressly defined by the 
BRRd nor harmonised by eu law.14 Article 32(4) of the BRRD set criteria for the 
failing or likely to fail (folTf) credit institutions and the concept of solvency should 
refer to these criteria.15 however the concepts of solvency and folfT do not coin-
cide, leaving room for wide discretion in the application of preventive measures to 
resolve distressed banks.16 as de groen observed, ‘taking into account that banks 
that are failing or likely to fail should be liquidated or resolved under the BRRD, 
precautionary recapitalisation should be reserved only for some solvent banks’.17 The 
lack of a clear definition of solvency and FOLFT is another case of discrepancy 
between eu rules and private law. it can be noted that the BRRd introduced a new 
concept of ‘failing or likely to fail’ in order to avoid the implementation of national 
insolvency laws.18
Article 32(4)(a)(b)(c) of the BRRD states that the institution does not and is not 
likely to, in the near future: (a) infringe the conditions for authorization, (b) hold less 
assets than liabilities, and (c) fail to pay its debts as they fall due. none of these 
requirements have been complied in the restructuring of the Italian bank: (1) MPS 
already benefited from two state recapitalisations in 2009 and 2013, and most inter-
estingly, the bank received a large bail-out package approved by the government in 
2016, (2) the financial performance of the bank in 2016 and Q1 2017 shows that the 
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio has dropped to 5.8 percent against a forecast of 
11.74 percent in the baseline scenario19, and (3) MPS recorded 33,61 percent of NPL 
a state guarantee of newly issued liabilities, or (iii) an injection of own funds or purchase of capital 
instruments at prices and on terms that do not confer an advantage upon the institution, where neither 
the circumstances referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of this paragraph nor the circumstances referred to 
in Art. 59(3) are present at the time the public support is granted’. 
14 The BRRD does not regulate bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings which remain in the sphere 
of national competence as an alternative measure to resolution. 
15 See EBA, Single Rulebook Q&A (2015_1777) <http://www.eba.europa.eu/single-rule-book-qa/-/
qna/view/publicId/2015_1777> (accessed 5 May 2018).
16 See World Bank-FinSAC, Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: a Guidebook 
to the BRRD (April 2017) at 106 <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/609571482207234996/FinSAC-
BRRD-Guidebook.pdf> (accessed 25 April 2018). It is pointed out that ‘the FOLTF definition used 
under the BRRD is rather vague (and it will be difficult in practice to define the point of non-viability) 
but gives the required discretion to intervene early enough’.
17 Willem Pieter de Groen, Precautionary Recapitalisations: Time for a Review (european Parlia-
ment, July 2017), at 11 <https://www.ceps.eu/publications/precautionary-recapitalisations-time-review> 
(accessed 20 april 2018).
18 The author is particularly indebted to the anonymous referee for helpful comments on this point. 
in doctrine see Matthias lehmann, BRRD, the SRM-Regulation and Private International Law: How 
to Make Cross-Border Resolution Effective, 17, <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/resolution_
cross-border_effects_-_lehmann.pdf> (accessed 12 May 2018).
19 Benoit Mesnard, Alienor Anne Claire Duvillet-Margerit and Marcel Magnus, Precautionary 
Recapitalisations under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive: Conditionality and Case Practice 
(European Parliament, Briefing, 16 June 2017), at 5.
EBLR_30-3_1_inner.indd   472 3/28/2019   2:00:34 PM
The ResTRucTuRing of MonTe dei Paschi di siena [2019] EBLR 473
ratio in 201620 and the amount of €28.6 billion of bad loans in 2016.21 according to 
the Banker, MPS places in the top four of the highest losses ranking with $3.4 billion 
while Italy figures the largest country for losses in the banking system with $16.3 
billion.22
This article suggests that the MPs case created a precedent to allow the granting 
of state bailout and minimising the applicability of bail-in to protect national interests. 
This can be seen as a circumvention of bail-in rules as result of a political justification 
which forces the determination of solvency (against insolvency), and consequently 
State aid can be granted according to Art. 32.4(d)(iii) of the BRRD that provides for 
a precautionary recapitalisation in cases of solvency assuming the other requirements 
are met.23 The next section examines the state of affairs of MPs discussing the main 
finance transactions that determined the collapse. Section three analyses the contro-
versial aspects of MPs rescue plans taking into consideration the possible outcomes 
of alternative restructuring options. section four looks at the issues of the restructur-
ing plan and its interaction with precautionary recapitalisation and extraordinary 
public support. The last section draws conclusive observations.
2. The Finance Transactions of MPS
MPs is an italian bank that operates in the retail and investment banking offering a 
wide range of financial services and products to private individuals and corporations.24 
20 Benoit Mesnard, Marcel Magnus and Alienor Anne Claire Duvillet-Margerit, The Precaution-
ary Recapitalisation of Monte dei Paschi di Siena (European Parliament Briefing, 6 July 2017), at 3.
21 European Commission, State aid: Commission Authorises Precautionary Recapitalisation of Ital-
ian Bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Press Release, Brussels, 4 July 2017, at 2. See also Monte dei 
Paschi di siena, BMPS: European Commission Approves the 2017-2021 Restructuring Plan, Press 
Release <http://english.mps.it/media-and-news/press-releases/2017/Pages/press_release_20170705.
aspx> (accessed 2 May 2018).
22 The Banker UK Press Release, Top 1000 World Banks 2017, 3 July 2017 <http://www.thebanker. 
com/Top-1000-World-Banks/The-Banker-UK-Press-Release-Top-1000-World-Banks-2017- 
foR-iMMediaTe-Release> (accessed 10 april 2018).
23 According to Art. 32.4 of the BRRD, the requirements for the precautionary recapitalisation are: 
(1) the institution is not failing or likely to fail (confined to solvent institutions), (2) there is a need to 
(avoid or) remedy a serious disturbance of the economy, (3) it is used to preserve financial stability, (4) 
it does not confer an advantage upon the institution, (5) it must be approved under the State aid frame-
work, (6) shall be of a temporary nature, (7) must be proportionate to remedy the serious disturbance, 
and (8) it must not be used to absorb incurred losses or likely future losses.
24 According to Art. 3 of BMPS By-laws, “the purpose of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (BMPS) 
is to collect and maintain savings and issue loans and credit, in various forms in italy and abroad, 
including any related activity permitted to lending institutions by current regulations. BMPs can carry 
out, in accordance with the laws and regulations in force, all permitted banking and financial activi-
ties and any other transaction which is instrumental, or in any case linked, to the achievement of the 
company’s purpose.” 
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its shares are traded on the ‘Mercato Telematico azionario’25 of the italian stock 
exchange and on the stock market index ‘financial Times stock exchange, Milano 
Italia Borsa (FTSE MIB)’. Founded in 1472, MPS is one of the oldest credit institu-
tions in italy with the main functions in providing sources of lending and trading 
securities on both domestic and international markets. originally established as 
“Monte di Pietà” with the purpose of funding and sponsoring local business activities 
in the city of Siena, nowadays MPS has evolved to a significant banking group in the 
global financial sectors.26
In 2014, MPS issued a variety of debt instruments (mainly tranches of notes, fixed 
or floating rate notes or zero coupon notes)27 both publicly and privately placed under 
‘debt issuance Programmes’.28 a large portion of MPs’s loans is secured by collat-
eral, a business strategy that affected the credit quality of the bank at time of the global 
financial crisis.29 This notwithstanding, MPs has a business duty of diligence to 
enforce on time any default and periodically reassess the value of the collateral pro-
vided in case that a re-collateralisation (i.e., an increase in the value of collateral) is 
25 Mercato Telematico Azionario is one of the main segments of the Italian Stock Exchange (Borsa 
italiana s.p.a.). it is a regulated market that offers a platform for trading shares, convertible bonds, 
warrants and option rights and it is mainly dedicated to medium-sized and large companies that are plan-
ning to raise domestic and international financial resources from institutional and professional investors 
in order to fund a growth project.
26 Under European Banking Union, MPS has been listed as significant supervised entity for the 
purposes of ssM regulatory framework. see european central Bank, The List of Significant Supervised 
Entities and the List of Less Significant Institutions, 1 January 2018 <https://www.bankingsupervision.
europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.list_of_supervised_entities_201802.en.pd> (accessed 25 March 2018).
27 Tranches of notes are portions of debt or structured financing notes, generally linked with other 
securities offered at the same time but with different structured risks, rewards and maturities. Tranches 
of notes are used as a method to customize structured finance products such as collateralised debt obli-
gations. The ranking of each tranche determines the order of payments. This order is usually referred 
to as a ‘waterfall’. The ‘waterfall’ can significantly affect the cash flows of each of the tranches and 
must be balanced in such way that investors are willing to purchase the different tranches of notes.
28 Specifically, senior or subordinated unsecured notes issued under the EMTN “€50 billion Debt 
issuance Programme” and covered bonds issued under the “€10 billion covered Bond Programme”. 
as stated by the Prospectus, ‘in purchasing notes, investors assume the risk that BMPs may become 
insolvent or otherwise be unable to make all payments due in respect of the notes’. each Tranche of 
notes was structured in bearer form and initially issued in the form of a temporary global note or a 
permanent global note. interestingly, the Prospectus provides that the ‘issuer shall be at liberty from 
time to time without the consent of the noteholders, the Receipt-holders or the coupon-holders to create 
and issue further notes having terms and conditions the same as the notes or the same in all respects 
save for the amount and date of the first payment of interest thereon and the date from which interest 
starts to accrue and so that the same shall be consolidated and form a single series with the outstand-
ing Notes’. In the aftermath of global financial crisis with persistent instability on markets, the risk of 
failure to repay on time loan products may deteriorate the credit quality of borrowers and affect the 
recoverability of loans, and amounts due from counterparties. By examining the structure of the notes 
contained in the Prospectus, it can be argued that the issuance of €50 billion debt instruments increased 
the risk to accumulate nPls in the balance sheet of MPs. see Monte dei Paschi di siena s.p.a., Debt 
Issuance Programme, Base Prospectus, 12 March 2015, at 90-91.
29 Nick Squires, Decline of Monte dei Paschi di Siena, World’s Oldest Bank, Leaves City Paying 
the Price, The Telegraph, 8 september 2012. 
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required in order to guarantee the repayment of the original obligation.30 further, MPs 
approved a restructuring plan which was part of the application process for receiving 
state aid in connection with the issue of new debt instruments.31 however, the dete-
rioration of the financial condition of MPS determined the failure to achieve the 
objectives set out in the restructuring plan32, entering into a new plan under the eu 
bank resolution regime.33
as a form of state aid, MPs obtained a recapitalisation of €1.9 billion on february 
2009 and a recapitalisation of €2 billion on december 2012.34 The italian government 
provided funds to MPS in exchange for equity instruments (common shares, prefer-
ential shares and hybrid capital) with the aim of strengthening the capital position of 
the bank. The recapitalisation exercise also aimed to deliver control over the bank to 
the government.35 in principle, eu law prohibits state aid unless it is allowed in very 
limited circumstances being in the kind and amounts of aid that pursue common 
policy and do not cause excessive distortion in the markets.36 although the assess-
30 MPS, Consolidated Half-Year Report as at 30/06/2016 <http:// english.mps.it/investors/investor-
relations/financial reports> (accessed 15 March 2018). The Prospectus states that ‘BMPS has entered 
into asset swap transactions involving italian government bonds, term-structured repo transactions and 
interest rate swaps. Two of such transactions were those referred to as: (1) Alexandria, entered into with 
Nomura, which involved Italian government bonds of €3.05 billion nominal amount, and (2) Santorini, 
entered into with deutsche Bank, which involved three separate total return swap transactions of €2 bil-
lion in aggregate nominal amount of italian government bonds’ (at 20). under the long-term structured 
repo transactions, the most significant risk to which MPS could be exposed is the credit risk of the 
sovereign. With reference to “santorini” and “alexandria” transactions, treated as synthetic derivatives 
for accounting purposes, the purchase of the notes and the financing under long-term repo contracts 
were presented and measured as credit default swaps under which protection was sold against the risk 
of default by the sovereign (the issuer of the underlying securities). having entered into asset swaps 
to hedge interest rate risk for both the alexandria and santorini transactions, the position’s sensitivity 
to interest rates is lower than its sensitivity to the creditworthiness of the sovereign. as a result of its 
own estimated margin requirements in respect of Alexandria, MPS could be required to make signifi-
cant cash expenditures, which could create additional liquidity stress for MPS, with a material adverse 
effect upon BMPS’s and the bank’s business, financial condition, results of operations and cash flows.
31 Ibid., 13.
32 The European Commission ordered BMPS to offload nearly €30bn of NPLs. Rachel Sanderson 
and Martin arnold, Monte dei Paschi To Cut Jobs and Sell Assets in Survival Plan, financial Times, 
25 October 2016.
33 Italy transposed the BRRD into law in November 2015 i.e., after the deadline of 31 December 
2014 imposed by Art. 130 of the Directive.
34 As publicly recognised in Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A., Debt Issuance Programme, 
see supra n 28, 97. See also European Commission, State aid n. SA.35137 (2012/N) – Italy Rescue aid 
to Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A., C(2012) 9660 final corr. <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/
cases/246983/246983_1401709_117_2.pdf> (accessed 25 February 2018).
35 See Communication on the recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: 
limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition 
(Recapitalisation Communication) OJ C 10, 15.1.2009, p 2 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
ALL/?uri=CELEX:52009XC0115%2801%29> (accessed 8 May 2018).
36 Art. 107(1) of the TFEU provides for a general prohibition of any aid granted by a Member 
State: “save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain 
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ment of whether state aid is compatible with the internal market is the competence 
of the european commission, the recapitalisation plan of MPs does not seem an 
exemption to the general prohibition according to Article 107(1) of the TFEU.37 
Article 32(4) of the BRRD regulates the precautionary recapitalisation providing that 
the injection of public support should be: (1) confined to solvent institutions, (2) 
temporary in nature, and (3) proportionate to remedy the consequences of the serious 
disturbance in the economy. it should not be used to cover losses that the institution 
has incurred or is likely to incur in the future. The amount of ‘precautionary’ capital 
that a bank can request from the State is the amount necessary to cover the capital 
shortfall deriving from the adverse scenario of a stress test exercise. in italy, the bank-
ing activity has traditionally been run by the business of retail investors, depositors 
and account holders who own the large proportion of shares, obligations and bonds 
in banks.38 The senior bondholder is represented by local entities and small investors 
rather than professional investors (i.e., hedge funds, mutual funds, insurance compa-
nies) as in other Member states.39
The domestic features of the Italian banking sector mainly reflect the presence of 
small and medium enterprises in the economy that control and finance the credit 
operations. The local function of banks shows that the credit system in italy is not 
sovereign: for this reason, it is more exposed to the risk of failures and more reluctant 
to the use of bail-in tool. interestingly, the state adopts public guarantees to protect 
bondholders from bank losses based on the assumption that ‘state aids, wherever they 
are used, should return to the state’.40 This mechanism allows to intervene with pre-
ventive measures however the precautionary recapitalisation does not seem confined 
to solvent institutions and proportionate to remedy the serious disturbance in the 
economy. The MPS case demonstrated that the 2009 and 2013 recapitalisations did 
not restore the liquidity and profitability of the bank, the sharp deterioration of equity 
and rapid increase of bad loans showed the long-lived problems of the institution.
The continue recourse to public support to rescue domestic banks contrasts with 
the aim of banking resolution and cannot be considered an exemption to state aid 
policies. in these terms, the precautionary recapitalisation is not a measure taken in 
exceptional circumstances to preserve financial stability. Further, the MPS collapse 
showed that the relevant competent authority i.e., ecB can use wide discretion in the 
supervisory powers.41 The recapitalisation of MPs can have backlash for the sover-
undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member 
states, be incompatible with the internal market”.
37 Art. 107(2) and (3) of the TFEU regulate the exceptions to the prohibition of State aid.
38 It is worth stressing that there are certain exceptions: for example, 63.5 percent of Unicredit’s 
shareholding is held by institutional shareholders. See the shareholder structure of Unicredit <https://
www.unicreditgroup.eu/en/governance/shareholders-structure.html> (accessed 6 May 2018).
39 For instance, MPS is controlled by a foundation with directors appointed by the city of Siena 
and nominated by the surrounding province, the university of siena and the archdiocese of siena. The 
bank also provides funds for social and cultural events.
40 Pier Carlo Padoan, State Aid is the Best Way to Rescue Veneto Banks, Il Foglio, 27 June 2017.
41 See ECB opinion of 3 February 2017 on liquidity support measures, a precautionary recapitalisa-
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eign debt and taxpayers’ money with the risk to end up in permanent state aids. The 
solution adopted to restructure MPs and, generally, the italian approach to solve 
banking problems are a clear example of the bail-out vicious cycle.
3. The Restructuring Plan of MPS
in 2016, MPs failed to pass the stress test exercise under adverse scenario42 and 
reported negative equity with a severe reduction of CET1 capital ratio.43 as a result, 
MPS announced the need to raise €5 billion from investors through a securitisation 
transaction and to reduce the net exposure of nPls in the portfolio.44 however, MPs 
did not succeed to find private investors and ended up to raise €1 billion by buying 
back subordinated securities with new shares. The failure of capital raising plan forced 
MPS to formally apply for a precautionary recapitalisation and liquidity support.
On December 2016, the Italian government passed the Law Decree No 237/2016 
– converted into Law No 15/201745 – that allocated €20 billion bail-out package to 
aid banks in difficulty.46 The Decree provides public financial assistance to manage 
banking crises and consists of liquidity support measures, and public recapitalisation 
measures. Liquidity measures are guarantees granted by the State on liabilities issued 
after the decree law’s entry into force, aiming to facilitate the bank’s ability to restore 
its own viability. The amount of guarantee needs to comply with the european com-
mission’s guidelines on state aid and, generally, is limited to the necessary restoration 
of the financing capacity. Although the Italian bail-out Decree demonstrates a will-
ingness to keep within the requirements defined by BRRD and SRM, it provides for 
tion and other urgent provisions for the banking sector (CON/2017/1), 5-6 <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/
ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2017_1_it_f_signed_.pdf> (accessed 2 May 2018).
42 Stress tests are indicators that assess the financial stability of banks. The test examines the three-
year period following a recent reference date and includes a baseline macroeconomic scenario together 
with the adverse scenario, which assumes the impact of one or more particularly severe shocks. The 
european stress tests are coordinated by the european Banking authority (eBa) that regulates the stress 
test exercise under the direct supervision of ecB.
43 As stated by the European Parliament, ‘under the adverse scenario, MPS’ fully loaded CET1 
capital ratio was reduced from 12.07 % at the end of 2015 to -2.44 % at the end of 2018, that is to say 
a reduction by EUR 10.1 billion (1451 basis points)’. See Benoit Mesnard and Marcel Magnus, Banca 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena: State of Play. (note for the Banking union Working group, 8 february 
2017), at 1.
44 The securitisation operation consisted in selling the junior tranche to shareholders and the sub-
scription of mezzanine notes by the atlante fund.
45 According to Law No 15/2017, three Italian Government guaranteed bonds have been issued by 
MPS. The bonds have been fully underwritten by the Bank at issue and subsequently placed to investors 
or used as collateral for funding operations. see MPS, Banca MPS: Issue of a New Government Guar-
anteed Bond, Press Release, 15 March 2017 <http://english.mps.it/media-and-news/press-releases/2017/
Pages/press_release_20170315.aspx> (accessed 23 May 2018).
46 The Law Decree No 237 of 2016 “Urgent measures for the protection of savings in the banking 
sector” provides guarantees for the public support of banks under liquidity and capital stress scenario.
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a substantial degree of burden-sharing and mainly seeks to avoid bailing-in certain 
groups of creditors.47
Public recapitalisation measures allow the state to underwrite increases in bank 
capital in a form of precautionary intervention under the ‘burden sharing’ principle.48 
According to Article 32(4)(d) of the BRRD and Article 18(4)(d)(iii) of the SRM, 
precautionary recapitalisation may be provided to solvent institutions under specific 
criteria that should not distort the competition and should not confer an advantage 
upon the institution. The Law Decree requires that only shareholders and holders of 
hybrid and subordinated bank bonds are involved in the burden sharing: the main aim 
is to avoid the involvement of the bank’s non-subordinated creditors under the bail-in 
rules.49 in addition, the law decree establishes a compensation mechanism to protect 
retail investors who will receive new shares following the burden sharing.50
under the decree, the access to public support is limited to banks that are not fail-
ing or likely to fail, but to banks that need to strengthen capital in case of the crisis 
or adverse scenario. as noted, ‘the application of the decree law to MPs represents 
a turning point for the bank and removes, even in the perception of the market, a high 
risk for the entire italian banking system’.51 closer examination of the decree sug-
gests that the government provides a mechanism of double guarantees: the guarantee 
to collateralise liabilities and sell the senior tranches under the state backed-scheme 
‘gacs’52, and the guarantee to inject capital by purchasing shares. The state pro-
47 Art. 22(1) of the Law Decree No 237/2016 regulates the burdens’ allocation between creditors, 
stating that ‘the subscription of issuer’s shares under art. 18 is made by the Minister of economy and 
finance after the burdens allocation procedure according to the terms of this article, with the aim of 
limiting the use of public funds’.
48 The ‘burden sharing’ principle for equity and subordinated holders represents a cornerstone of the 
precautionary recapitalisation process of MPs. it is a mandatory conversion of all subordinated bonds 
issued by the Bank to both institutional and retail investors before the subscription of shares by Min-
istry of economy and finance. in this context, see Monte dei Paschi di siena, 2017-2021 Restructur-
ing Plan, 5 July 2017, 4 <http://english.mps.it/investors/investor-relations/presentations/Conference%20
call%20%20Wednesday%2005%20July%202017%20at%20830%20CET/Restructuring%20Plan%20
2017-2021_Final.pdf> (accessed 27 March 2018).
49 Bank’s shareholders accept (1) the dilution of their shares following the State’s intervention, and 
(2) the conversion into equity of the subordinated bonds. Holders of hybrid and subordinated instruments 
accept the conversion into equity of these instruments, in whole or in part, as necessary.
50 The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) may intervene to purchase these shares and in 
exchange investors will receive ordinary bonds from the bank (issued at par by the bank or a company 
that is part of the same group) for a value equal to the amount paid by the MEF for the purchase of 
the shares. The compensation scheme can be accessed under limited circumstances: (1) compensation 
may only be provided to retail investors, not qualified or professional investors, and (2) the MEF may 
intervene in support of a settlement agreement between a bank and these investors to avoid or resolve 
a dispute concerning the selling of converted instruments.
51 Carmelo Barbagallo, Hearing on Decree Law 237/2016 Urgent Measures for the Protection of 
Savings in the Banking Sector, Joint session of the sixth committees of the senate of the Republic 
(Finance and Treasury) and the Chamber of Deputies (Finance) (Rome, 17 January 2017), at 12.
52 The Guarantee on Securitisation of Bank Non Performing Loans (GACS) introduced by the Law 
Decree No 18/2016 is an aid-free scheme aiming to assist Italian banks in securitising and moving NPLs 
off their balance sheets. The state guarantee consists in remunerating the senior notes at market terms 
EBLR_30-3_1_inner.indd   478 3/28/2019   2:00:35 PM
The ResTRucTuRing of MonTe dei Paschi di siena [2019] EBLR 479
vides a double securitisation: (1) on the credit enhancement of senior notes, and (2) 
on the collateralised losses of the junior bondholders. on the one hand the state pro-
tects the creditors through the collateralisation of losses and recapitalisation measures, 
on the other hand it accumulates debts and spreads the costs of public intervention to 
taxpayers. Although the aim is to preserve financial stability and safeguard taxpayer’s 
money, the guarantees mechanism seems a sort of privatization of profits and exter-
nalization of losses where the state acts as a cushion to rescue troubled banks under 
a ‘public interest umbrella’.
Following the bail-out package, the ECB raised the capital requirements of MPS 
from €5 billion to €8.8 billion in light of the rapid deterioration of the CET1 ratio and 
liquidity position of the bank. Specifically, the MPS’s capital shortfall in the adverse 
case scenario led to the recourse of precautionary recapitalisation approved in July 
2017.53 The capital injection of €8.1 billion54 is the final outcome of the agreement 
reached on 1 June 201755 on the restructuring plan that showed the viability of the 
bank and the ability to meet capital requirements, along with the formal commitment 
from private investors to purchase the stock of nPls.56 as a result, MPs received a 
consistent bail-out through the recapitalisation plan in order to prevent a serious dis-
turbance in the economy and to protect the market.
according to the risk taken i.e., in a manner acceptable for a private operator under market conditions. 
The Ministry of economy and finance (“Mef”) can issue a gacs guarantee to secure the payment 
obligations of italian sPVs in relation to senior tranches of asset-backed notes issued by the sPVs 
within the securitisation transactions of NPLs according to the Italian securitisation law No 130/1999. 
see european commission, State Aid: Commission Approves Impaired Asset Management Measures 
for Banks in Hungary and Italy, Press release, IP/16/279, 10 February 2016 <http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-16-279_en.htm> (accessed 5 March 2018).
53 European Commission, supra n 21, at 2.
54 See Mesnard, Magnus and Margerit, supra n 20, at 1. it is worth noticing that the ecB calculated 
a capital shortfall of €8.8 billion, the difference between the €8.1 billion capital injection and the ecB 
shortfall calculations is covered by asserts sales. In the €8.1 billion capital injection, €3.9 billion will 
be provided by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), whilst the remaining €4.3 billion 
will result from the mandatory conversion into equity of the Tier 1 and Tier 2 bonds issued by the Bank, 
in line with eu rules on burden-sharing. at the same time, as a form of compensation for mis-selling, 
eligible retail investors of the Bank’s 2008-2018 upper Tier ii notes will be offered the option to sell 
their converted shares to the Mef, in exchange for senior bonds of BMPs, for a total estimated amount 
of around €1.5 billion. At the end of the recapitalisation process, the MEF is expected to contribute 
€5.4 billion becoming the majority shareholder of BMPS with a stake of around 70 percent. See DBRS 
Maintains Review of BMPS Ratings Until Completion of Burden Sharing and Recapitalisation, Press 
Releases, 11 July 2017 <http://www.dbrs.com/research/313044/dbrs-maintains-review-of-bmps-ra#> 
(accessed 21 May 2018).
55 European Commission, Statement on Agreement In Principle between Commissioner Vestager 
and Italian Authorities on Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), STATEMENT/17/1502, 1 June 2017.
56 The restructuring plan provides for a five-year restructuring period during which BMPS is com-
mitted to realign its equity capital and, most importantly, to transfer €26.1 billion NPLs to a privately-
funded special vehicle with the financial support of the fund Atlante II.
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On 28 July 2017, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) implemented bur-
den sharing and capital increase measures to enhance the liquidity of MPS.57 These 
measures aimed to strengthen the cash flow of bank through the conversion of finan-
cial instruments into newly-issued ordinary shares of the Bank (“Burden sharing 
decree”), and the subscription of shares by the Mef (“Recapitalisation decree”). 
According to Article 22(2)(4) and Article 23(3) of the Law Decree No 237/2016, the 
‘Burden sharing shares’ provides their holders with the same administrative and 
ownership rights as the MPs shares already in issue. The MPs shares subscribed by 
the Mef were issued at a price per share of €6.49, in exchange for cash from the Mef 
in accordance with the recapitalisation.58 however, the state intervention is a measure 
to avoid the use of bail-in mechanism that should have been the practical resolving 
instrument for the italian bank.59 although MPs was not considered a failing institu-
tion deemed into unresolvable conditions it has fallen under exceptional circum-
stances that required last resort actions. A controversial case that raises questions 
about the necessity (and compatibility) of the aid interventions to non-global systemic 
credit institutions in financial distress.60
since the interaction of BRRd, the single Resolution Mechanism and state aid is 
not well defined there might be risk of unfair practices in the choice of viable restruc-
turing options.61 The delineation between the BRRd and sRM regime provided for 
MPs an exception as it is not a global systemically important bank (g-siB) but still 
is supervised by the ecB and its resolution should have been handled by the single 
Resolution Board. Paradoxically, the margin of discretion left to national authorities 
to categorize non-g-siBs or domestic systemically important institution (d-siBs), 
and the involvement of the ecB and the commission make the dividing line between 
the bank categories rather obscure. BRRd and sRM do not provide a clear distinction 
between the restructuring tools available for g-siBs and d-siBs, leaving the respon-
sibility to adopt the proper arrangement to the resolution authorities.62 This lack of 
consistency creates a grey area in which the loopholes for public financial support 
can affect the reorganisation actions among failing banks.63 The suitable solution 
57 BMPS: the Ministry of Economy and Finance Issues Burden Sharing and Capital Increase Mea-
sures for the Precautionary Recapitalization, Financial Press Release, 29 July 2017 <http://english.mps.
it/media-and-news/press-releases/ComunicatiStampaAllegati/2017/CS_decreto%20MEF_28072017_
ENG%20RQ.pdf> (accessed 25 April 2018).
58 Ibid., at 2.
59 Lucrezia Reichlin, The European Banking Union Falls Short in Italy, Financial Times, 27 June 
2017.
60 Francois-Charles Laprévote and Melanie Paron, The Commission’s Decisional Practice on State 
Aid to Banks: An Update 14 European State Aid Law Quarterly 98 (2015). 
61 See Ioannis Kokkoris, State Aid Law v. Single Resolution Mechanism: David v. Goliath or Vice 
Versa 10 International Corporate Rescue 392, 393 (2013).
62 The distinction between G-SIBs and D-SIBs is not mentioned in the EU rules. The EU distinc-
tion is between significant and not significant institutions: significant banks are supervised by SSM and 
their crisis is handled by sRM, the others by national authorities.
63 James R Barth, Chris Brummer, Tong Li and Daniel E Nolle, Systemically Important Banks 
(SIBs) in the Post-Crisis Era: ‘The’ Global Response, and Responses Around the Globe for 135 Coun-
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would be a set of harmonised standards for resolving non-systemically global bank 
institutions and more tighter state-aid regulation, rather than the extension of the 
resolution toolbox to all cases of bank distress, irrespective of the systemic relevance 
of the failing institution.64 This could avoid problems of legal uncertainty i.e., dif-
ferent national resolution policies, divergent public support strategies, inconsistent 
interpretation among domestic authorities as to how strict the rules on the allocation 
of losses to stakeholders and on exemptions from bail-in under Article 44(3) BRRD 
and Article 27(5) SRM should be applied.65 one of the main aims of the new eu bank 
resolution regime is to avoid the recourse of taxpayers’ money to save a bank, includ-
ing the use of State financial support.66 as the sRM, one of the pillars of the Banking 
union, introduced special regulatory tools for dealing with failing banks there are 
concerns that state aid – in theory a temporary measure because of potential distor-
tions in the markets due to moral hazard incentives67 – may become a new frontier to 
avoid bail-in rules
4. An Analysis of the Restructuring Options
in an attempt to avoid a bail-in restructuring, which means imposition of losses on 
its creditors, the Bank of italy tried to secure a privately backed bailout of MPs.68 The 
bank considered a “voluntary” debt-for-equity offer to holders of roughly €5 billion 
of junior subordinated debt at a premium yet to be determined. The recapitalisation 
of MPS originally involved a €5 billion rescue plan with strict conditionally, guaran-
teed by a pool of investment banks led by JP Morgan. Specifically, the new capital 
would have been used to reduce gross nPls by half (i.e., to the italian average of 18 
percent of loans) while the core tier one ratio would remain at a semi-respectable 11.4 
percent.69 as stated by the Bank of italy, ‘the ‘market solution’ was directed at private 
tries in allen n Berger, Philip Molyneux, and John os Wilson (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Banking, 
617 (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
64 Jens-Hinrich Binder, Proportionality at the resolution stage: Calibration of Resolution Measures 
and the Public Interest Test (3 July 2017), 20 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2990379> (accessed 13 May 
2018).
65 Ibid., at 21.
66 Ioannis Kokkoris and Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, The Operation of the Single Resolution Mecha-
nism in the Context of the EU State aid Regime in Jens-hinrich Binder and dalvinder singh (eds), Bank 
Resolution: The European Regime, 316 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
67 Conor Quigley, European State Aid Law and Policy, 403 (3rd edn., Oxford: Hart Oxford, 2015), 
where it is pointed out that ‘rescue and restructuring aid are among the most distortive types of state 
aid’. see also Kelyn Bacon, European Union Law of State Aid, 409 (2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2013); Julia Flavie Collinet, State Aid in the Banking Sector: A Viable Solution to the ‘Too 
big To Fail’ Problem? 7 Global Antitrust Review 151 (2014).
68 Nicolas Véron, ‘Italy’s banking problem is serious but can be fixed’, Bruegel Blog Post, 14 
July 2016 <http://bruegel.org/2016/07/italys-banking-problem-is-serious-but-can-be-fixed/> (accessed 
5 May 2018).
69 ‘Monte dei Paschi: Something or Nothing’, Financial Times, 27 September 2016. The new equity 
would cover the coupons on BMPs’s bonds and protect the bondholders about the amount of loan losses.
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investors and aimed to drastically reduce the bank’s credit risk, thereby guaranteeing 
its stability in the face of the negative result of the stress test published in July 2016 
by the eBa’.70
MPs’s restructuring plan relied on capital from the private sector and government 
guarantees in order to: (1) increase coverage on bad loans from 63 percent to 67 per-
cent, and coverage on other problematic loans from 27 percent to 40 percent, (2) 
securitise and deconsolidate all NPLs, and (3) raise €5 billion capital to reach a CET1 
ratio of 11.4 percent on a fully phased-in basis.71 Further, the restructuring aimed to: 
(1) avoid write-down or conversion of subordinated creditors, and (2) reduce nPls 
to 18 percent, consistent with the draft request made by the SSM.
The €5 billion capital increase was subject to the completion of the securitisation 
and to other conditions which included the successful pre-marketing of the rights 
issue. The equity capital increase failed and MPS applied for State aid, which in turn 
resulted in the precautionary recapitalisation (i.e., write-down or conversion of the 
bank’s subordinated debt).72 The state guarantees envisaged under the new restruc-
turing scenario on the bank debt, as well as other liquidity support measures, are 
generally directed to banks that have long-term viability.73 it is important to emphasise 
that MPs already received state support on two occasions in the past. The recourse 
to public financial assistance increased the reliance to aids and undermined the cred-
ibility of the BRRd rules. it can be assumed that state intervention has acted as the 
lender of last resort for failing banks replacing de facto the function of central banks 
to solve liquidity issues.74 In this context, Article 32(4) of the BRRD and Article 18(4) 
of the sRM expressly refer to the state aid regime, which incorporates both the sub-
stantive provisions of Article 107 TFEU and the corresponding powers of the Com-
mission. The MPs case showed that the commission tends to delegate to the national 
authorities the decision on the solvability of the bank’s assets and liabilities which in 
theory, according to Article 36(1) of the BRRD, should be carried out by independent 
experts.75 Without the additional equity, MPS could struggle to pay the coupons on 
70 Bank of Italy, The ‘Precautionary Recapitalization’ of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena <https://
www.bancaditalia.it/media/approfondimenti/2016/ricapitalizzazione-mps/index.html?com.dotmarketing.
htmlpage.language=1> (accessed 25 June 2018).
71 Moody’s Investor Service, ‘Global Credit Research’, 8 August 2016.
72 The market-based approach was not successful as the negative outcome of the Italian consti-
tutional referendum of december 2016 created political instability and failed the MPs’s attempts to 
convince private investors to recapitalise the bank.
73 Moody’s Investor Service, supra n 71, at 20. As observed, ‘when the bank is considered not 
to be viable in the long-term, it can obtain support but then has to be resolved and liquidated in an 
orderly fashion’.
74 Christos V Gortsos, Last Resort Lending to Solvent Credit Institutions in the Euro Area before 
and after the Establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), paper presented at the euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB) Legal Conference: “From Monetary Union to Banking Union, on the way to 
Capital Markets Union: new opportunities for European integration” held in Frankfurt on 1-2 September 
2015, 12-13 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2688953> (accessed 5 June 2018).
75 Art. 36(1) of the BRRD provides that ‘a fair, prudent and realistic valuation of the assets and 
liabilities of the institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of art. 1(1) is carried out by a 
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its outstanding debt instruments (involving italian government bonds), given pro-
jected loan losses. Following the approved State aid, EU rules required bondholders 
be written down first.76 any rescue package should have been under the sRM, which 
means a bail-in where junior MPs bonds most likely are converted to shares. it is 
evident that the main issue between the sRM and national resolution authorities was 
the conditions under which the italian government has been allowed to conduct the 
recapitalisation. as donnelly noted, ‘the way in which the italian government han-
dled the assistance favored the commission over the ecB regarding information and 
consultation, and revealed commission accommodation for bending the rules to the 
breaking point’.77 it can be argued that in the case of MPs the eu commission 
adopted an exemption believing the risk of collapse of the italian bank could trigger 
a systemic crisis in the domestic economy.78 The problem is whether the risk of a 
collapse for a non-global systemically important bank can justify the adoption of 
exceptional circumstances. Specifically, the basis of Article 107(3)(b) of the TFEU, 
‘remedy serious disturbance’79 under which the commission authorized state aid 
measure to MPs in the past80 can be seen as contentious as few years later faces a 
similar scenario.
The BRRd and the sRM state that a recovery plan should consider the systemic 
importance of the institution and its interconnectedness, and the degree to which sup-
port would be credibly available to address the deterioration.81 further, the resolution 
tools should be applied before any public injection of capital or equivalent extraor-
dinary public financial support to an institution.82 however if the recovery and reso-
lution plans aim to avoid the recourse to bailout plans or state aid, in the case of MPs 
the national authorities demonstrated to rely upon government financial assistance to 
restore the viability of the bank. a paradoxical situation where ‘the MPs episode casts 
a spotlight on the difficulties of keeping the tasks delegated to independent technocrats 
separate from politics’.83
person independent from any public authority, including the resolution authority, and the institution or 
entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of art. 1(1)’.
76 Resolution tools are regulated in the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive.
77 Shawn Donnelly, Liberal Economic Nationalism, Financial Stability, and Commission Leniency 
in Banking Union 21 Journal of Economic Policy Reform 166 (2017).
78 In October 2008, the Commission acknowledged that the crisis was severe enough to qualify 
as a “serious disturbance in the economy” of the Member states as a whole and that aid to remedy 
the consequences of the crisis could therefore be declared compatible on an exceptional basis under 
Art. 107 (3)(b) of the TFEU.
79 See Case SA.34032, Reintroduction of the Italian Guarantee Scheme <http://ec.europa.eu/com-
petition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_34032> (accessed 10 April 2018).
80 European Commission, State Aid: Commission Authorises Restructuring Aid for Italian Bank 
Monti dei Paschi di Siena, Press Release, Brussels, 27 November 2013 available at: <http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-13-1174_en.htm> (accessed 5 April 2018).
81 Recital 21 in the preamble to BRRD Directive and Art. 10(2) of the SRM.
82 Recital 55 in the preamble to BRRD Directive.
83 Benjamin Braun, Two Sides of the Same Coin? Independence and Accountability of the Euro-
pean Central Bank, Transparency International EU 25 (2017) <https://transparency.eu/wp-content/
uploads/2017/03/TI-EU_ECB_Report_DIGITAL.pdf> (accessed 2 April 2018).
EBLR_30-3_1_inner.indd   483 3/28/2019   2:00:36 PM
andRea Miglionico484
The rescue of MPs replayed the troubles of Portugal’s Novo Banco, where the 
largest investors took the hit while retail bondholders were shielded, resulting in a 
collapse in investor sentiment and capital flight.84 however, the problems in the ital-
ian banking sector are not solved by the state bailout of MPs. Bailing out MPs 
through the precautionary recapitalisation without the proper implementation of the 
long-term viability plan would just allow to maintain alive a “zombie bank”.
in MPs there has been a market dissemination of subordinated bonds to retail 
investors who were not presented with a full disclosure of potential risks.85 as result, 
the italian government introduced a compensating scheme for affected retail investors 
whereby they would be able to convert the subordinated debt securities into equity.86 
even if such a political strategy might be desirable87, it can be considered as a cir-
cumvention to the applicability of bail-in on junior debt holders, which according to 
the burden sharing principle applies when granting state aid.
The rules contained in the BRRD are largely flexible to allow member states to 
adopt the policy measures necessary to protect the public interest, even if the directive 
does not define the boundaries of ‘public interest’ in case to provide public support.88 
Specifically, the competition between State aid rules and BRRD rules opens room for 
wide interpretation of the applicable regime in a way that it could not be consistent 
with the public interest. The recapitalisation of MPs could create a major impact on 
risk management with the possibility of having to face unintended consequences, 
particularly a roll-back to the pre-BRRd era.89
84 This resulted in litigation in the UK (see Goldman Sachs International v. Novo Banco SA [2015] 
EWHC 2371 (Comm)). The main issues in Novo Banco case were the following: (1) re-transfer of 
liability from bridge bank (Novo Banco) to insolvent old bank (Banco Espirito Santo), (2) no stay of 
proceedings (parallel Portuguese proceedings in public law are likely to take years), (3) not in con-
formity with the description of resolution powers in the BRRd, and (4) settlement of english dispute. 
85 European Commission, Press Release dated 1 June 2017 titled Statement on an Agreement In 
Principle between Commissioner Vestager and Italian Authorities on Monte Dei Paschi di Siena (MPS). 
86 The financing to buy the equity from the original retail investors is obtained from new secure 
senior debt instruments. The commission understands that such compensation scheme is an entire 
separate consideration to burden sharing under the state aid framework. see european commission, 
Press Release dated 1 June 2017 titled Statement on an Agreement In Principle between Commissioner 
Vestager and Italian Authorities on Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS).
87 Martin Sandbu, Banking Union Will Transform Europe’s Politics, Financial Times, 26 July 2017, 
who observed that in the recent banking failures ‘spain offered a glimpse into the future of bank regu-
lation, while italy clung to the bad habits of the past. on this discrepancy, italy demonstrated greater 
ability to lobby for its case, however power is not all; it matters what one uses it for’. Further, banks in 
italy are run by politically embedded foundations a scenario that show an incestuous relation between 
state and credit institutions. This phenomenon can determine the following effects: ‘deep confusion 
between the national interest and that of the banking sector; hidden subsidies from taxpayers to banks, 
protecting both their managers and their investors; and gross inefficiencies in an allocation of capital 
driven more by political and personal priorities than economic logic’.
88 Stefano Micossi, Ginevra Bruzzone and Miriam Cassella, Fine-tuning the Use of Bail-In to Pro-
mote a Stronger EU Financial System, CEPS Special Report No. 136 (April 2016), at 16-17.
89 Case C526/14, Kotnik, opinion of ag Wahl, 18 february 2016. The commission’s Banking 
communication examined the status of burden-sharing (bail-in) as a condition for the provision of 
state aid to failed banks.
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5. Concluding Remarks
MPs constituted a real concern to the italian central Bank and the ecB. To reduce 
the likelihood of authorities’ intervention and increase the role of creditors, the pro-
cess of resolution and rehabilitation represents the potential challenges investors and 
policymakers may face.90 MPs tested the suitability of the ssM and the new resolu-
tion regime to resolve failing banks in an orderly fashion.91 however the case of MPs 
demonstrated that banks rely on government rescues and it is difficult to predict a 
change in the regulatory approach to bailout programmes. it could be said, in philo-
sophical terms, another failure of “Vichian memory”.92
90 Moody’s Investors Service, Rated Bank Defaults and Government Support During the Crisis: A 
New Database and Study, 1 august 2016.
91 Matthias Haentjens, New Bank Resolution Regime as an Engine of EU Integration, oxford Busi-
ness Law Blog, 14 June 2017 <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2017/06/new-bank-
resolution-regime-engine-eu-integration> (accessed 19 May 2018).
92 The terminology refers to Giambattista Vico, an Italian philosopher of the eighteenth century who 
developed, in his famous work the Scienza Nuova, the cyclical theory of history “the corsi e ricorsi”, 
in which ‘obscure beginnings, slow development, rise to fame and influence, followed by an inevitable 
decline and fall, after which the entire cycle is repeated once again-we cannot be sure how soon or 
how often’. see giambattista Vico, Unabridged Translation of the Third Edition (1744) (cornell uni-
versity Press, Third edition, 1984). also see the comment of isiah Berlin, Corsi e Ricorsi 50 Journal 
of Modern History 480 (1978).
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